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■ Army and DIA review(s)
completed.

■ DOS review(s) completed.

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SUMMARY

GENERAL

1. Embassy Moscow sees possibility of indirect Soviet intervention in Korea under cover of Mongolian "volunteer" assistance (page 3).




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
3. US Ambassador pessimistic about Spain's defense capabilities (page 4).
4. Militancy waning in Italian Communist Party (page 5).

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GENERAL

1. Embassy Moscow sees possibility of indirect Soviet intervention in Korea under cover of Mongolian "volunteer" assistance:

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Embassy Moscow believes that the USSR may attempt to bolster the Chinese Communists and still avoid direct Soviet involvement in the Korean war through the device of providing "volunteer" assistance from the Mongolian People's Republic to the North Korean and Chinese Communist forces. Such an intervention would merely be a mechanism cloaking actual Soviet participation in the Korean war, since the ostensibly Mongolian units could in fact consist of Soviet army or air force units containing nationals of various yellow races in the Soviet Far East and Central Asia. This intervention would be welcomed by the Chinese and could alleviate criticism of the USSR which has undoubtedly developed within the Chinese Communist Party and among the Chinese people in view of the heavy losses in Korea caused by Soviet failure to provide sufficient planes and equipment.

In the Embassy's opinion, inauguration of effective Communist air intervention from across the border should be recognized on the one hand as "final and total abandonment by the Chinese People's Republic of willingness for a negotiated settlement," and on the other hand as an "unequivocal act of war against the UN."

Comment: In response to questions concerning the alleged Soviet plans to utilize a "volunteer army" including Mongolians in Korea, the Department of the Army has commented that (a) the Mongolian People's Republic has an army of about 30,000, with some token mechanized elements and an air arm of sorts; (b) this force could be increased to a strength of 100,000 by utilizing other Mongolian personnel; and (c) it is doubtful that more than five well-trained divisions of Soviet Mongolians could be formed at this time. No all-Mongolian units are known to exist in the Soviet armed forces, and few of the Soviet Mongoloid nationalities would be trained in technical skills (which the Chinese Communists also lack).

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3. US Ambassador pessimistic about Spain's defense capabilities:

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


The US Ambassador in Madrid has forwarded the following statements from a report of his Air Attache: "The Spanish Air Force possesses only two radar sets.

Anti-aircraft exists only in project form. Present flying equipment

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would last only a few days. The majority of the Spanish Air Force have never seen a jet." In the Ambassador's opinion, a comparable situation exists in the Spanish Navy and, to a slightly lesser degree, in the Army. He comments that it is becoming increasingly obvious that Spain will be incapable of defending the Pyrenees or any other line unless it is given military equipment and assistance.

Comment: The US Ambassador's comments are believed to be completely accurate. For more than a year, service attaches in Madrid have emphasized that Spain could only briefly delay an attack by a strong, modern military force. In March 1951, US Army Intelligence estimated that Spanish forces could delay a ground attack through the Pyrenees for a maximum of two weeks.

4. Militancy waning in Italian Communist Party:

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Italian Communist leader Secchia admitted at the party congress on 5 April that insufficient zeal and a devotion to sectarianism or opportunism on the part of even the most active Italian Communist militants were hindering the active development both of the party and of Communist-dominated "front" organizations such as the General Labor Confederation and the Partisans of Peace. He also admitted that the party might have to send militants from Communist strongholds in North Italy to the southern districts in order to build up party prestige in those areas.

The US Embassy in Rome comments that Secchia's admissions confirm its belief that the Italian Communist Party has lost much of its momentum and that the decline in enthusiasm among the masses and even among party militants may prevent the Communists from enlisting the support of the majority of Italians in their campaign against the Atlantic Pact.

Comment: Secchia's statements confirm the increasing lack of interest in Communist Party activities previously reported as prevalent among provincial elements of the

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party. Party discipline, however, will probably ensure that these elements, despite their lack of zeal, vote "correctly" at the forthcoming municipal elections. The Communists will probably not be able to remedy the lack of militancy confronting the party unless economic conditions deteriorate.

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